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Abstract. This essay aims to demonstrate how, in Addresses to the German Nation, the 
Fichtean polemic against Dogmatismus is determined under the concept of temporality 
and, in particular, within the dimension of the Geschichstphilosophie. As is known, the 
entire Fichtean work (from the juvenile Revolutionsschriften up to the late Staatslehre, 
printed in 1813) is dotted with stands against the dogmatic and fatalistic conceptions 
of history, where the latter is reduced to an automatic process, independent from 
human action. Fichte opposes these perspectives - in line with the principles of the WL 
and the "system of liberty" - a conception of historicity as a non-deductible "series" 
(Reihe) of human actions that articulate themselves over time. The Reden an die 
deutsche Nation of 1808 will be the basis for an examination of the Fichtean 
conception of temporality and, in particular, to see how the fight between WL and 
Dogmatismus translates into a new form, that is, a stance against the circular 
Zeitauffassung. 
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1. FOREWORD 
Some of the critics argue, not without good reason, that the critique of dogmatism is 
the constant cipher of Johann Gottlieb Fichte's thought, in every aspect and at every stage 
of its development (see, for instance, Martin 1998; Duso 1974; Cesa 1992; Philonenko 
1968; Ivaldo 1987). The Dogmatismus assigns the primacy to the 'done', the 'being', the 
existing conditions, the objectivity conceived as a factum brutum, and the necessity: for 
this reason, it is the constant polemical target of the Fichtean transzendentalphilosophisch 
in every field (gnoseological, theological, political, moral), both in the Darstellungen of 
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the Wissenschaftslehre (= WL), and in the works of the so-called populäre Lehre, i.e. 
those text that are traditionally considered by the Fichte-Forschung to be less significant 
from a strictly philosophical point of view (Zöller 2011, 350). 
The Fichtean System der Freiheit, centered as a whole on the "mediacy of positing" 
and the consequent transcendental assignment of primacy to action, configures itself as a 
critical stance towards dogmatism, also in the sense of the heroic "titanism" that Hölderlin 
recognized in Fichte's words while attending his lessons in Jena (Hölderlin 1910, 96). 
This absolute primacy of the facere on the esse is the cipher of Fichte's constant polemic 
against the Dogmatismus and, in a convergent way, in the words of Isabelle Thomas-
Fogiel, "the structural core, the common core of all the doctrines of science" (Thomas-
Fogiel 2004, 9), Ariadne's thread for orienting oneself in the archipelago of Fichte's 
writings (in the "particular sciences", but also in the Darstellungen of the WL). 
Even at a hasty glance, the struggle against dogmatism in all its variations is clearly 
the trait d’union among all the expositions of the WL, beyond any alleged Kehre in 
Fichte's theoretical development (see, for instance, Ravà 1958, 254–255). In the field of 
gnoseology, the de-fatalizing purview – coessential with the System der Freiheit – 
articulates itself as the overcoming of the Kantian aporia of the Ding an sich through the 
act of consciousness (and, therefore, by the assumption of knowledge as a Tat-
Handlung); in the moral and political spheres, it is intended as an intersubjective action 
within the community, aimed to transform the state of things in view of its concordance 
with human subjectivity; in the religious sphere, as a rejection of the divinity understood 
as an "object" of worship and in the assumption of God as a moralische Weltordnung (see 
Fichte 1962, 347; Ivaldo 1999; Brito 2007), i.e. as an ordo ordinans that expresses itself 
in human praxis ("in the intimate consciousness that God actually lives, moves, and 
perfects his work in us" (GA, I, 9, 114), as argued later in Anweisung zum Seligen Leben); 
in the conception of the scholar, as a codification of the Gelehrter as a practical agent of 
transformation and as a guide of the human race (see Cantoni 1933); and, finally, in the 
idea of art conceived not as a mere duplicate of the real, but as a free and active creation 
("does not present itself for a replica, but for a form that is free and independent from the 
image itself" /Fichte 1845–1846, 280/). Even the existence of our body is demonstrated as 
a function of its action in the sensible world (Cogliandro 2011). 
This essay aims to demonstrate how the Fichtean polemic against Dogmatismus is 
determined under the concept of Zeitauffassung and, in particular, within the dimension 
of the Geschichstphilosophie. As is known, the entire Fichtean work (from the juvenile 
Revolutionsschriften up to the late Staatslehre, printed in 1813) is dotted with stands 
against the dogmatic and fatalistic conceptions of history, where the latter is reduced to an 
automatic process, independent from human action. Fichte opposes these perspectives – 
in line with the principles of the WL and the "system of liberty" – a conception of 
historicity as a non-deductible "series" (Reihe) of human actions that articulate themselves 
over time. The Reden an die deutsche Nation (= RD) of 1808 will be the basis for an 
examination of the Fichtean conception of temporality and, in particular, to see how the 
fight between WL and Dogmatismus translates into a new form, that is, a stance against 
the circular Zeitauffassung.  
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2. CRITIQUE OF THE DOGMATISMUS 
As is known, the Bestimmung des Menschen (1800) constitutes a populäre 
Darstellung of the WL nova methodo and is written, as admitted by Fichte himself, so as 
to be understood by "anyone capable of understanding a book" (SW, II, 167). The first 
book of the work is significantly titled Zweifel: it is an exposition of the dogmatic 
perspective of those who consider the I as a mere product of the surrounding material 
world. In fact, the "doubt" to which the title refers concerns the choice between 
Idealismus and Dogmatismus, a topic already at the core of the First Introduction to the 
WL, dated 1797. 
The first dogmatic system outlined in Bestimmung des Menschen corresponds, in particular, 
to the reading of Spinoza diffused by Jacobi in Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den 
Herrn Moses Mendelssohn (1785) (Verweyen 2001), which shows how Spinozism annulates 
liberty and, subsequently, moral action; moreover, Spinozism was already presented as the most 
consistent reversal of the WL in the Grundlage (dated 1794–95) (Lauth 1978; Ravà 1958; 
Wright 2003). In the dogmatic perspective, of which Spinozism is the most consistent 
expression, the I becomes a link in the chain of the necessity of nature, an inert product of a 
world that acts univocally on him and determines him in a mechanical way. So in the first book 
of the Bestimmung des Menschen we have: "for I do not truly act at all, but Nature acts in me" 
(SW, II, 189). And more: "for I am not the author of my own being, but Nature has made me 
myself, and all that I am" (SW, II, 189).  
This critique of Dogmatismus and the consequent existential "doubt" suffered by the 
dogmatist has been rightly described as Fichte's self-criticism towards its juvenile 
orientation, prior to the discovery of the praktische Vernunft and the foundation of the 
System der Freihei (Radrizzani 1996). This argument has been supported by Stefano 
Bacin (2003) and, above all, by Reiner Preul (1969)
1
 in his seminal study on Fichte's 
relationships with the German philosophers of the XVIII century who had the most 
influence on his thought – a work that also shows that the early determinism of the thinker 
of Rammenau is more Wolffian than Spinozian.  
Wissen, the second book of the Bestimmung des Menschen, describes biographically 
the Fichtean development of the WL during the Grundlage of Jena. It shows, through an 
imaginary dialogue with the Spirit, how the Idealismus attributes to the acting I the same 
force that dogmatism assigns to nature: "[...] since there shall be no other power over my 
actions but this will" (SW, II, 192). Everything derives from the I and nothing is thinkable 
without its acting. Convincingly, Ives Radrizzani argued that the Bestimmung des 
Menschen can be rightly understood not as a fracture in Fichte's theoretical development, 
but as a moment of further investigation, consistent with the previous Denkweg, precisely 
because of the condemnation of that Dogmatimus which Fichte embraced at the very 
beginning (Radrizzani 1996, 672). 
Anyway, if we are assuming that this tough and never definitive battle against the 
Dogmatismus (consistent with the program of 'bad infinity' criticized by Hegel 
/Königsson-Montain 1993; Kiss 1997; Furlani 2006/) is the core of Fichte's 
Strebungsphilosophie, it is also true that the key moment of this struggle – or, one might 
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say, its most accomplished systematization – should be found in the pages of the Erste 
Einleitung (1797). As is well known, the Erste Einleitung – strongly influenced by the 
Schellingian Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kritizismus (1795) (Huhn 
1994; Okada 2003) – is the version of the WL that, more than any other, recognizes the 
root of philosophy in a practical act. The work is entirely built on the well-known frontal 
opposition between Idealismus and Dogmatismus (Brandt 1978; Cogliandro 2000). 
Written in 1797, it was published along with the Zweite Einleitung on the 
"Philosophisches Journal": the two essays were conceived as a new exposition of the WL, 
the Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der WL, to be published in four issues of the journal 
between 1797 and 1798. As is known, the project came to an end due to the controversies 
of the Atheismusstreit. 
Dogmatism, as explained in the Erste Einleitung (SW, I, 428 ss), is the typical attitude 
of those who accept the world in its givenness, assuming it as a given empirical fact, 
moving from the belief in the existence of an external object that is independent from us 
and is able to determine us – a 'thing in itself' that has to be reflected at the gnoseologic 
level: ―According to the Dogmatist, all phenomena of our consciousness are productions 
of a Thing in itself (alles, was in unserem Bewusstseyn vorkommt, Product eines Dinges 
an sich)‖ (―Nach ihm ist alles, was in unserem Bewusstseyn vorkommt, Product eines 
Dinges an sich‖: ibidem) that is external and independent from a subject who may only 
reflect it. As a consequence, ―Every logical dogmatist is necessarily a Fatalist‖ (Ibidem) 
(jeder consequente Dogmatiker ist nothwendig Fatalist), as ―The principle of the 
dogmatist is: Faith in the things‖ (SW, I, 433) (das Princip der Dogmatiker ist Glaube an 
die Dinge) and in the dead positivity of the real (Maesschalck 1996, 76 ss). 
If, according to the teaching of the first Kantian Kritik, ―The a priori conditions of the 
possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of 
the objects of experience‖ (―Die Bedingungen zur Möglichkeit der Erfahrung und 
zugleich der Gegenstände derselben‖: Kant 1781 (e 1787), B 197), then, once the Ding 
an sich is removed, the human subjectivity is given the full opportunity to determine the 
objective world without external influences, positing it into being according to ―a priori 
conditions‖ which coincide with those of unconditioned practical liberty. Also from this 
point of view, the strong nexus that links the Fichtean reflection and the Revolution is 
clear: as pointed out by Gurvitch, ―his rejection of the dogmatic premises of Kant's 
philosophy is related to the realistic and heroic humanism of the French Revolution‖ 
(Gurvitch 1962, 9–60), a living image of the I that posits itself to determine the not-I (on 
the relation between Fichte and French Revolution, see Duso 1987; De Pascale 1975; La 
Vopa 1989; Giubilato 1979).   
In contrast to the dogmatism as a philosophia pigrorum, the Erste Einleitung 
promotes transcendental idealism as the only philosophy of liberty, since it moves from 
the I and its creative and transformative activity (Amadio 1991, 52 ss). Transcendental 
idealism moves from the belief that the subject is truly free and nothing can be given apart 
from his action, at a due distance from the dogmatism of those who, like Kant, move from 
the assumption that there is an object that falls beyond the scope of the subject. One 
choice lies at the core of each orientation and is evidence of the liberty of the I: in the 
words of the Erste Einelitung, ―The dispute between the Idealist and the Dogmatist is, in 
reality, the question, whether the independence of the I (Selbstständigkeit des Ich) is to be 
sacrificed to that of the Thing (Selbstständigkeit des Dinges), or vice versa?‖ (―Der Streit 
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zwischen dem Idealisten und Dogmatiker ist eigentlich der, ob der Selbstständigkeit des 
Ich die Selbstständigkeit des Dinges, oder umgekehrt, der Selbstständigkeit des Dinges 
die lies Ich aufgeopfert werden solle‖: SW, I, 433). 
In the second Kritik, Kant's critical philosophy laid the foundations of the absolute 
liberty of the I.  If one wants to take advantage of this acquisition, he has to free himself 
from the dogmatic assumption of the first Kritik, i.e. the maintenance of a ―thing in itself‖ 
that subsists apart from that absoluta liberty. Therefore, the consistent completion of the 
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft is not the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, but the WL, that is, 
the transcendental idealism for which nothing exists regardless of the practical liberty that 
manifests itself by determining the objective world. So we come back, by citing Xavier 
Léon, to the ―idea that inspires the whole philosophy of Fichte: Liberty, the causality of 
Practical Reason‖ (Léon 1902, 38), i.e. the active determination of the world by the acting 
I (Massolo 1948, 159). This is the essence of Fichte's philosophy, which – according to 
Massolo's formula – fights ―for Reason and the reasons of men‖ (Ivi, 23). As suggested 
by Wayne Martin (1998, 53–54), dogmatism and realism are not synonyms for Fichte, 
since the idealist is realist (in terms of explaining the real in idealist terms, in such a form 
called ―ideal-realism‖ in the Grundlage of Jena by the philosopher of Rammenau /Fuchs, 
Ivaldo, Moretto 2001/), whereas the dogmatic is a materialist that moves from the given 
objectivity of the world and, on the basis of this, gives reasons to everything else. 
As stated in the Erste Einleitung (Der letzte Grund der Verschiedenheit des Idealisten 
und Dogmatikers ist sonach die Verschiedenheit ihres Interesse: SW, I, 433), the 
irremediable clash between the two different philosophical positions of idealism and 
dogmatism leads, in first order, to two different practical interests: for the dogmatist, the 
unlimited maintenance of the existing; for the idealist, the free transformation of reality in 
view of its concordance with reason. The former, by virtue of its apologetic acceptance of 
what 'is', reflects the existing in its givenness by assuming it as an unchangeable datum, 
which exists regardless of the subject and his praxis; the latter, moving from the 
antithetical assumption that there are not things-in-themselves, but only the inexhaustible 
praxis of the subject that acts, transforms and changes the Gegenstände by positing it into 
being, is involved in a perpetual quarrel with the existing, which he refuses to assume as 
an untranscendable ―thing in itself‖. For the dogmatist, the I is a passive reflection of the 
world (or also a product of objective circumstances); the idealist believes instead that the 
world is the result of human action and, at the same time, the object on which exercise 
this action. 
For the Dogmatismus, all is derived from the object as a datum that is independent 
from the subject: knowledge is the reflection of the existing and politics is the 
preservation of the world as it is, thus considering history as an automatic process, 
circular and devoid of novelty. For the Idealismus, everything derives from the 'doing': 
'knowing' is the action that entails the subject-objective unity, politics is the inexhaustible 
transformation of the existing in view of its always deferred identity with the Ich, and 
history is a theatre where non-deductible human actions freely articulate themselves over 
time. It is up to us to choose the nexus for thinking our relation with the world, with all 
the ensuing consequences that this entails on the practical sphere (Tagliavia 1998).  
Anyway, the Grundlage of 1794-95 had already sarcastically pointed out that it would 
be easier to convince most people to consider themselves ―a piece of lava on the moon‖ 
(ein Stück im Lava Monde) than an autonomous, active and responsible 'I'. Inertia, 
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cowardice and vileness push the individual toward dogmatism, which is nothing else than 
the tomb of the praxis of the social subject and his unlimited possibilities of operation. As 
an antithesis to this attitude, the idealist believes that the praxis can change the state of 
things and nothing is impossible for the subject-agent: ―When he says: 'I can not', it is 
because he does not want‖ (SW, VI, 102 ss). As suggested by Claudio Cesa, Fichte 
considers the ―thing in itself‖ as ―a phantom to be removed to secure one's liberty‖ (Cesa 
1992, 134), i.e. to release the praxis from every given dead positivity. Again, from the 
point of view of transcendental idealism, the theoretical profile of Kant is contradictory, 
since the maintenance of the thing-in-itself totally contradicts the practical absolute liberty 
thematized in the second Kritik (Ivaldo 2012).  
Thus Fichte addresses the reader, showing him how independence and liberty can be 
gained through the removal of the dogmatism of the Ding an sich: ―The reality in which 
you formerly believed – a material world existing independently of you, of which you 
feared to become a slave – has vanished‖ (GA, I, 6, 252). In a diametrically opposite 
way to the idealistic orientation, dogmatic philosophy opposes a positively given, dead 
reality to the I, assuming the ens as equal – if not superior – to the I: ―In the critical 
system the thing is posited in the I. In the dogmatic system is that in which the I is 
posited‖ (Amadio 1998, 46; Bourgeois 1968, 5). 
The issue of the Auseinandersetzung between the idealist and the dogmatist 
resurfaces in the Zweite Einleitung, in which it is argued that - reformulating the thesis 
of the primacy of action over 'being' (and the consequent deduction of the 'being' from 
the 'doing'
2
) – ―the only positive for the idealist is Freedom; being is the mere negative 
of freedom" (SW, I, 462), i.e. the concrete objectivation in which it crystallizes must 
always, in first instance, be removed from its free action: "But dogmatism, which 
believed itself safely reposing upon being, as a basis no further to be investigated or 
grounded, regards this assertion as a stupidity and horror‖ (SW, I, 463; see also De 
Pascale 1995; Fonnesu 2002). 
3. DOGMATISM AND IDEALISM IN THE REDEN 
Among all Fichtean works, the RD have been most frequently subject to mystifying 
interpretations. Now considered as an episode of the Reaction, or even as a first step 
towards Nazi madness (according to a hegemonic line that included Arnold Gehlen 
among others /Gehlen 1935, 12/), the RD have been almost immediately subject to a 
particular Wirkungsgeschichte, which prevented its interpretation as a resumption of the 
struggle against dogmatism from a new perspective, and, eo ipso, as a coherent 
development of the System der Freiheit.  
In what sense is anti-dogmatism (and the idealistic passion for practical liberty) at the 
core of the RD? This aspect remains incomprehensible as long as we insist on interpreting 
the work, dated 1808, as a mere defence – maybe not free from racialist connotations – of 
Germanness against other European cultures and peoples (De Pascale 1977; Rametta 
2003). In order to understand the anti-dogmatic scope of the Addresses and, therefore, 
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their full consistency with the ―system of liberty‖, it is necessary to disrupt this locus 
communis. In other words, we have to show that the RD, far from being a racist polemic 
against non-Germanic peoples, are completely faithful to the cosmopolitical system 
codified by Fichte since the times of Jena (De Pascale 2001, 2004; Picardi 2009; about 
Fichte‘s philosophy in Jena, see Fonnesu 1993).  
In very concise terms – but nonetheless faithful to the wording of the Fichtean text – 
the RD change the perspectives laid down in Jena not in virtue of a rejection of 
cosmopolitanism, but because they move from the assumption that cosmopolitanism can 
be built only from patriotism (Maesschalck 1996b. Fonnesu 1996). In fact, as Fichte 
repeatedly states in the RD, it is necessary to walk along the path of patriotism to achieve 
the goal of cosmopolitanism. The former was not intended to be opposed to the latter: one 
cannot love and take care of humanity if he does not move from its specific geographical 
location, that is, the national state in which he lives. So Fichte writes about the German: 
 ―In his frame of mind love of fatherland and sense of world citizenship are most 
intimately united, and, indeed, stand both in a definite relation.  Love of fatherland is his 
act, sense of world-citizenship is his thought; the first is the phenomenon, the second is 
the inner spirit of this phenomenon, the invisible in the visible‖ (GA, I, 8, 450). 
In other words, the patriot is called up to always consider his fatherland – which he 
loves and cares for – as a part of humanity, and therefore not as a territory to be expanded 
at the expense of other peoples (colonialism is absent in Fichtean works, and is even 
openly condemned in Der geschlossene Handelsstaat /Thomas-Fogiel 2004, 235/), but as 
an asset that, in its irreducibility, stands as a treasure for humanity. The latter is intended 
as a multiplicity of differences where the unity of the human race is expressed. 
In this sense, Fichte argues that cosmopolitanism without a fatherland ―goes in the 
opposite direction, it is worthless and meaningless (GA, I, 8, 450)‖. On the one hand, it 
remains entirely abstract on a theoretical level and does not operate on a practical level 
(the only way to be actually cosmopolitan is, in fact, to promote the universalism of 
emancipation moving from a national community); on the other hand, in the historical 
dimension, it corresponds to the alienated cosmopolitanism belonging to the universalism 
of the Handelsanarchie (SW, III, 453; Furlani 2005) denounced in Der geschlossene 
Handelsstaat, i.e. the ―commercial anarchy‖ that produces, in its own image and likeness, 
the conformation of mankind by reducing it to an amorphous aggregate of selfish atoms. 
The idea of a dialectic union of cosmopolitanism and patriotism is also at the center of 
Der Patriotismus und sein Gegenteil, where it is argued that the ―opposite‖ of patriotism 
is, at a closer look, its essential correlate: 
―While cosmopolitanism is the dominant will that the purpose of the existence of the 
humanity be actually realized in humanity, patriotism is the will that this end be first 
realized in the particular nation to which we ourselves belong, and that this 
achievement thence spread over the entire race. [...] In fact, cosmopolitanism is 
necessarily patriotism. [...] And every cosmopolitanism is necessarily patriotic through 
the limitation given by the nation. And he who, in his nation, is the most energetic and 
diligent patriot is rightly, for that very reason, the most diligent cosmopolitan, since the 
ultimate goal of every making of a nation is always that this making extends itself to 
the whole human race‖ (GA, II, 9, 399–400). 
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As pointed out by Günther Zöller, in confirmation of the indissoluble bonds between 
patriotism and cosmopolitanism in the Fichtean reflection, ―the education of the German 
nation is the starting point for a creative education of the whole of mankind. In such a 
cosmopolitan perspective, Fichtean nationalism appears as a provisional nationalism or 
even as a temporarily limited cosmopolitanism‖ (Zöller 2011, 354). Both in the ―first‖ as 
in the ―second‖ Fichte, the telos is always cosmopolitical, as it coincides with the 
emancipation of mankind conceived as a unity. 
Moreover, against the well-established demonizing trend that condemns Fichtean 
nationalism as racist and as a forerunner of the worst tragedies of the twentieth century 
(Abizadeh 2005), one would seek in vain any reference to race in the RD (and, more 
generally, in the entire production of Fichte). In fact, the German nation conceived as a 
cultural and linguistic unity – never racial nor biological – is always seen as the starting 
point for a renewal and a universalizing progress, intended to be a world-historical force. 
As suggested by Walz, aberrant ideas such as racial and blood unity are completely 
unconnected with the Fichtean perspective and, more generally, with all forms of 
idealism (Walz 1928, 536).  
On the other hand, since the Von der Sprachfähigkeit und dem Ursprung der Sprache 
dated 1795, Fichte unconditionally rejects the possibility of discriminating people on 
ethnic or racial grounds. As argued by Guéroult with reference to the Volk of Reden, in 
Fichte ―It is no longer race that defines this ‗absolute people‘, but rather its aptitude for 
liberty and its revolutionary mission.  The word German thus takes on an entirely 
cosmopolitan signification. [...] Germanness no longer designates anything but the 
character possessed by all those who recognize themselves as belonging together to a 
single fraternal humanity (a people)‖ (Guéroult 1939). For this reason, according to 
Léon, the RD are in all respects a continuation of the struggle ―that he never ceased to 
lead for the realm of liberty and the triumph of democracy‖ (Léon 1922–1927, 119). So 
in the seventh address of the RD there is a famous passage that needs to be carefully 
examined: 
 ―Whoever believes in spirituality and in the freedom of this spirituality, and who 
wills the eternal development of this spirituality by freedom, (ewige Fortbildung 
dieser Geistigkeit durch Freiheit), wherever he may have been born and whatever 
language he speaks, is of our blood; he is one of us, and will come over to our side. 
Whoever believes in stagnation, retrogression, and the round dance of which we 
spoke, or who sets a dead nature at the helm of the world‘s government, wherever 
he may have been born and whatever language he speaks, is non-German and a 
stranger to us; and it is to be wished that he would separate himself from us 
completely, and the sooner the better‖ (SW, VII, 375). 
More than between Germans and foreigners, the RD create a polarization at the universal 
level between progressives and regressionists, i.e. between the supporters of the lineare 
Zeitauffassung and the advocates of the cyclical conception of temporality. The Germans 
have to assume the future as the realm of the novum and colonize it with projects aimed at 
the rejuvenation of the world, through a tireless engagement in transcending the existing 
conditions which 'presentifies' themselves – in accordance with the framework of the System 
der Freiheit – in view of the deferred unity of the human race. 
In the RD, the polarization between idealism and dogmatism declines itself in 
temporality, in the form of the opposition between the futurizing conception of those who 
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bet on an open future and determine it actively through thought and action, and the 
cyclical perspective of those who accept fatalistically the state of things, which is 
considered as unavoidable, senseless and recursively immutable. For those who believe in 
the future, the praxis and the freedom of action remain the only means capable of ensuring 
that the future corresponds to their projects; for them, ―history, and with it the human 
race, does not unfold itself according to some mysterious hidden law, like a round dance; 
on the contrary, in his opinion a true and proper man himself makes history, not merely 
repeating what has existed already, but throughout all time creating what is entirely new. 
Hence, he never expects mere repetition‖ (SW, VII, 368). In contrast, we have the cyclical 
conception of temporality: ―once this foreign spirit is present among Germans it will, 
therefore, reveal itself in their actual life also, as quiet resignation to what they deem the 
unalterable necessity of their existence, as the abandonment of all hope of improvement 
of ourselves or others by means of freedom, as a disposition to make use of themselves 
and everyone else just as they are, and to derive from their existence the greatest possible 
advantage for ourselves‖ (SW, VII, 368). 
According to the line of argument of the RD, all those who believe in the freedom of 
human action and in an unlimited process of emancipation of mankind that has to find its 
expression in future – regardless of sex, age, and origin – should go into partnership with 
the German people, in order to achieve the goal already described in the Bestimmung des 
Gelehrten of Jena (―all the powers of man, which are essentially but one power, and only 
become distinguished in their application to different objects, should all accord in perfect 
unity and harmony with each other‖ /SW, VI, 297/): this conception of time, typical of 
Germans, is ―the view that regards the human race as eternally progressing, and that refers 
all its activities in this world solely to this eternal progress‖ (SW, VII, 394). 
This explains the seemingly cryptic statement contained in Der Patriotismus und sein 
Gegentheil, which argues that only Germans are able to ―put the whole of humanity as the 
aim of their nation‖ (GA, II, 9, 404-405), since only Germans can actually save human 
civilization from its reversion into barbarism: ―If Germany does not save human 
civilization, no other European nation can do it‖ (SW, VII, 184). In the RD, the WL 
assumes the status of a theoretical platform for an action program that, through the 
Gelehrter and the concrete ethics of the German people, is destined to have a profound 
effect on the history of mankind.  
In the fourteen addresses of the RD, therefore, the dichotomy between Germans and 
non-Germans is a re-proposal of the oppositions between idealists and dogmatists at the 
center of the Erste Einleitung, between transcendental criticism and conservative 
dogmatism, between the creative idealism of Germans and the fatalistic dogmatism of 
other peoples that have opted for a circular and iterative conception of temporality. An 
example of this is the seventh address of the RD, characterized by a pathos bordering on 
enthusiasm that is heavily influenced by the historical context in which it was written: 
 ―So, let there appear before you at last in complete clearness what we have meant 
by Germans, as we have so far described them. The true criterion is this: do you 
believe in something absolutely primary and original in man himself, in freedom, in 
endless improvement, in the eternal progress of our race, or do you not believe in 
all this, but rather imagine that you clearly perceive and comprehend that the 
opposite of all this takes place? All who either are themselves alive and creative and 
productive of new things, or who, should this not have fallen to their lot, at any rate 
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definitely abandon the things of naught and stand on the watch for the stream of 
original life to lay hold of them somewhere, or who, should they not even be so far 
advanced as this, at least have an inkling of freedom and do not hate it or take fright 
at it, but on the contrary love it—all these are original men; they are, when 
considered as a people, an original people, the people simply, Germans.  All who 
resign themselves to being something secondary and derivative, and who distinctly 
know and comprehend that they are such, are so in fact, and become ever more so 
because of this belief of theirs; they are an appendix to the life which bestirred itself 
of its own accord before them or beside them; they are an echo resounding from the 
rock, an echo of a voice already silent; they are, considered as a people, outside the 
original people, and to the latter they are strangers and foreigners‖ (SW, VII, 373). 
As we have seen, Germans are not defined by racial or ethnic connotations. Fichte 
believes that their quintessential prerogatives, in a cultural sense, are both creativity and 
spirit of transformation, namely the anti-adaptive passion that characterizes the WL: 
Germans are, in fact, the idealists, ―all who either are themselves alive and creative and 
productive of new things‖ (GA, I, 10, 195), that is, those who act for and believe ―in 
endless improvement, in the eternal progress of human race.‖ These are ―original men; 
they are, when considered as a people, an original people (ein Urvolk), the people (das 
Volk schlechtweg) simply, Germans.  All who resign themselves to being something 
secondary and derivative [...] they are an appendix to life‖ (Ibidem), and, for that very 
reason, cannot be Germans.  
Just like the opposition between idealists and dogmatists at the center of the Erste 
Einleitung, also the contraposition between being German or non-German described in 
the RD is actually the free choice of the individual, done accordingly to his own 
inclinations. Every free spirit will choose to belong to the German people: ―whoever 
believes in spirituality and in the freedom of this spirituality, and who wills the eternal 
development of this spirituality by freedom‖ (SW, VII, 375). More than an actually 
existing people, we have the impression here that Fichte is talking about an 'ideal people', 
to be constructed from the cultivated circle of listeners of the RD during Napoleon's 
occupation of Germany.  
As noted by Radrizzani, ―national categories remain foreign to the reflection of Fichte. 
Fichte does not think in terms of nation: he also states clearly that it is not enough to 
speak German and live in Germany to be Germans‖ (Radrizzani 1996, 120). For example, 
Schelling (who Fichte once addressed as ―Polyphemus without an eye‖ /GA, II, 5, 485/), 
dogmatic Germans, and Nicolai cannot be considered as such, since they are standard 
bearers of world views that are incompatible with the WL. Therefore, the RD theorize an 
'inner border' (according to Etienne Balibar's formula /Balibar 1990/), that is, a purely 
philosophical border that the individual may freely cross if he chooses to adhere to 
idealism and create a political community capable of thinking and acting according to the 
principles of the doctrine of science. The ―true criterion of differentiation‖ (eigentliche 
Unterscheidungsgrund) lies precisely in the will to pursue human liberty: this is, as we 
read in the above quotation, the only criterion for differentiation among individuals and 
peoples. Just as in the EE one could freely choose whether to be idealist or dogmatist, in 
the RD one can opt for being a German (endorsing the WL) or not (embracing the 
fatalistic laziness of dogmatic views) (Kohn 1949). This choice would not definitively 
exclude a possible reconsideration or a change of perspective.  
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In this sense, Radrizzani continues, ―under the veneer of nationalistic language, Fichte 
seeks to promote his own ideas, which aren't nationalist at all. In the final analysis, to be 
German means to be Fichtean, that is, to assume the German nation to make a 
commitment to criticism; the real nation of the true patriot is the supra-national science, 
i.e. the realm of 'pure spirit' (Radrizzani 1996, 121)‖, the framework of the WL and its 
cosmopolitical message directed to every man as such, aimed to the emancipation of 
mankind conceived as a unity. 
The German people – says Fichte – ―will be characterized by a spirit that is not narrow 
and exclusive, but universal and cosmopolitan‖ (GA, I, 10, 189). Called upon to fight 
against the Napoleonic oppression, the German people become a beacon of human liberty 
against slavery, showing every other nation how to act concretely, be it against foreign 
invasions (―a nation of slaves is not possible‖ /SW, VII, 549/) or for the internal 
development and organization of the State. According to Fichte, this goal should be 
achieved by balancing liberty and equality (―all citizens are born equal‖ /SW, VII, 554/3), 
suppressing the aristocracy and granting free cultural education to every member of the 
community (―no hereditary aristocracy, but free education for all‖ /SW, VII, 559/). 
Here we come to Fichte's transition from his original conviction (at the center of his 
juvenile Beitrag), that is, the development of the human race under French hegemony, to 
the new idea that the German people should accompany humanity along its process of 
emancipation. Also from this point of view there is some continuity with the early works, 
even taking into account the remarkable and undeniable novelties in Fichtean thought. All 
the deeds done by France as an educator of mankind are now contradicted by the 
Napoleonic conquests, which Fichte considers a perversion of the love for freedom and 
emancipation. 
Therefore, Germans have to comply with the duty of educating humanity, embracing 
the linear conception of time: their metabolization of the WL leads them to assimilate the 
free and revolutionary spirit of French revolution, which is the foundation of the doctrine 
of science. We could then argue, without exaggeration, that the RD may be considered a 
rewriting (though full of novelties and acquisitions related to the different historical 
context) of the Beitrag, with the universalist role previously attributed to the French at the 
time of Revolutionsschrift now assigned to the Germans. As the French awakened 
humanity in 1989 from the sleep of the ruling dogmatism, now it is up to the Germans to 
defeat the dogmatic laziness that consider the existing power relations and the completed 
sinfulness of our time as an ineluctable fate. The only way to be idealists consists in 
adopting the lineare Zeitauffasung and acting in freedom to determine history. 
The anti-dogmatic vocation of the whole System der Freiheit is perfectly highlighted 
in the fourteenth address of the RD, where Fichte argues that ―all human relationships, the 
whole special province of man, are made only by men themselves and by absolutely no 
power outside them‖ (SW, VII, 487). History is not conceived as a circle in which each 
event is repeated eternally, but as a linear process determined by the acts of human liberty 
that articulates itself over time – a topic already developed in Bestimmung des Menschen. 
                                                          
3 See Fonnesu 1985. See also Moretto 1999, 156. As said by Luigi Pareyson, for Fichte ―la società degli 
individui in reciprocità è la realtà e l‘assoluto è la vita della società come reciprocità degli individui‖ (Pareyson 
1950, 304). 
 D. FUSARO 74 
Moreover, the WL, as pointed out by Reinhard Lauth and Giannino Di Tommaso (Di 
Tommaso 1986, 68 ss; Lendvai 1997), contains in its own structure a philosophy of 
history of the free human praxis that articulates itself sub specie temporis. The WL, in 
fact, is based on the mediation of time, on the infinite effort of action, and thus on the 
necessary temporalization of praxis that is the very condition of making and thinking 
history as an inexhaustible work of positing, overcoming and maintaining the existing 
objectivations, i.e. the results of the unabhängige Tätigkeit.  
The lineare Zeitauffassung codified by Fichte as the driving force of his conception of 
history is, in itself, the essential condition (a transcendental prerequisite) for human praxis 
to take place in the form of a continuous determination, as opposed to the circular 
dogmatic view: ―The first end of all my actions is a new acting in the future‖ (GA, I, 5, 
234) and, through a synergistic nexus for which the opening on the future makes the 
acting possible, and the latter, in turn, is able to determine the future, ―the will not only 
embraces, but also determines the future‖ (SW, III, 118; Ivaldo 1987b). 
On the one hand, the extraordinary events of his time – from the French Revolution to 
the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, the rise of Napoleon and his downfall – led 
Fichte to endlessly focus on history and to develop a thought full of historical questions; 
and, on the other hand, the very structure of the WL – sparked from the events of French 
Revolution – explicitly lays down the foundation of a linear conception of temporality, 
insofar as it theorizes the tension between the I and the not-I. As never definitively 
resolved at a finite level, this tension produces the space of history as a theater of 
continuous action by the empirical I.  
In this regard, there is a crucial passage – among many others – in the Bestimmung des 
Menschen that, while theorizing the linear conception of history, actually makes explicit 
the premises of the WL on a world-historical level: ―The universe is to me no longer that 
ever-recurring circle, that eternally-repeated play, that monster swallowing itself up, only 
to bring itself forth again as it was before; it is [...]  a constant progress towards higher 
perfection in a line that runs out into the Infinite.‖ (SW, VII, 364). Nor should it be 
forgotten that, since the Grundlage of Jena, time itself is conceived as a product of 
practical activity, and more specifically of the individual synthetic acts of consciousness, 
with respect to which the Zeit is produced as an inner experience (Rohs 1994; Inciarte 
1970). As time is produced in consciousness as a relation among the individual acts of 
consciousness, so the time of universal history is posited into being as a relation among 
the acts of the human race that is freely objectivating itself, i.e. as a living relation 
between the empirical egos that continuously recreate the objective world in new forms 
and, in doing so, they become more and more aware and united.  
Such a linear conception articulates the principles of Grundlage on a world-historical 
level, in which the future-centrism becomes a transcendental precondition for the free 
praxis (every cyclic conception neutralizes the praxistic determination), and strengthens 
the entire Fichtean work since the early writings. The possibility of history as a theater of 
self-consciousness, praxis, and recognition granted only by human freedom is, 
ontologically speaking, established a priori in the framework of the WL. This liberty is 
open towards a constantly deferred future, which allows for rekindling the practical effort 
over and over again. 
―This ontological-metaphysical foundation of human progress is not equivalent to the 
affirmation of a necessary and automatic movement of history‖ (PICARDI 2009, 119), 
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since the latter always stands as one of the many versions of that fatalism against which 
Fichte had explicitly constructed his ―system of liberty‖ (history itself, in this way, would 
become a ―thing in itself‖ cut loose from ties with human freedom). To hypostatize the 
Geschichte in an acting and autonomous force means to fall down again into dogmatism, 
as the objectivations of the I are assumed as autonomous and able to determine the I itself, 
thus ending up in a lethal reversal of subject and object (the fetishistic absolutization of 
objectivity) that neutralizes the free human praxis.  
There is a passage of RD in which the thinker of Rammenau rejects in the strongest 
possible terms the ―historical fatalism‖ and, at the same time, triumphantly insists on the 
possibility for men to freely determine, in an active way, their conditions, their ages, their 
own history:  
 ―To let everything that happens pass by one unperceived, perhaps to close eye and 
ear diligently to its urgent message, and even to boast of such thoughtlessness as if 
it were great wisdom - this may be the proper thing for a rock on which the waves 
of the sea beat without its feeling them, or for a tree-trunk dashed to and fro by 
storms without its perceiving them; but in no wise does it beseem a thinking being. 
Even the thinker who dwells in the higher spheres is not absolved from this general 
obligation of understanding his own age. Everything that is on the higher plane 
must want to influence the immediate present in its own fashion; and he who truly 
lives in the former lives at the same time in the latter also‖ (SW, VII, 447). 
Therefore, only the linear conception of temporality can be consistent with the 
teachings of Fichte's WL and Strebungsphilosophie, by assuming historical time as the 
unlimited space of human action, oriented asymptotically to the rationalization of all that 
'is'. The lineare Zeitauffasung, i.e. the way the struggle against dogmatism re-articulates 
itself sub specie temporis in the RD, is the only conception of time that is compatible with 
the unlimited effort ins Unendliche, which lies as the foundation of the WL since the 
Grundlage of Jena (Pannenberg 1992).  
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NEMAČKI JEZIK I PROLAZNOST VREMENA:  
WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE U FIHTEOVOM OBRAĆANJU 
NEMAČKOM NARODU 
Cilj ovog rada je da ilustruje kako je, u Obraćanju nemačkom narodu, fihteovska polemika 
protiv Dogmatismus-a smeštena pod okrilje koncepta prolaznosti vremena, odnosno smeštena u 
okvir dimenzije Geschichstphilosophie. Kao što je već poznato, Fihteov čitav opus (od ranog 
Revolutionsschriften pa sve do kasnog Staatslehre, delo štampano 1813.) ispresecan je jakim 
stavom protiv dogmatskog i fatalističkog shvatanja istorije, u kom slučaju se ovo drugo svodi na 
automatski proces, koji se posmatra nezavisno od ljudske aktivnosti. Fihte je bio protiv ovakvih 
stavova – prihvatajući principe WL i "Sistema slobode" – shvatanja istorije kao "niza" (Reihe) 
nerazdvojivih ljudskih aktivnosti koje se manifestuju kroz vreme. Reden an die deutsche Nation iz 
1808. poslužiće kao osnova za analizu fihteovskog shvatanja prolaznosti vremena a pre svega da 
bi se utvrdilo kako se sukob između WL i Dogmatismus prevodi u jedan novi oblik, odnosno stav 
protiv cirkularnog Zeitauffassung. 
Ključne reči: prolaznost vremena, dogmatizam, sloboda, istorija. 
    
